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Independent investigations of aviation accidents and incidents have been broadly accepted 
within the aviation sector throughout its history as a valuable tool to enhance safety. Such 
investigations enable the sector to learn by establishing the sequence of events that provides a 
satisfactory explanation of the accident leads to the drafting of recommendations to prevent 
reoccurrences. In addition, these investigations, which are publicly disseminated, encourage 
public confidence in the sector. Other transport sectors, including road, rail and water, have 
been slower in coming to enjoy the same acceptance of independent investigations; here, there is 
considerable variation amongst nations, and—with the exception of the International Civil 
Aviation Organization agreement—almost no international consistency. This article examines 
why aviation has had a different tradition in this regard. Reasons are found in parallel growth of 
aviation technology and the philosophy of investigative bodies, the inherently international 
aspect of commercial aviation, and the role of public and political pressure following major 
accidents. The safety investigative orientation of the aviation sector is gradually expanding to 
other transport sections and beyond that to other sectors such as fixed site production plants, 
health care, and management of natural disasters. With the newly installed Safety Investigation 
Board, the Netherlands has arguably placed itself at the head of this league table.  
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1. Taking off on the right foot 
Aviation accident investigation is as old as aviation itself. Even before the Wright brothers, 
accident investigation at the international level has been an integral part of aviation policy 
making. Starting with ‘lighter than air’ craft, there was a need for supra-national agreements 
because hot air balloons could drift across national state borders and the vulnerability and limited 
manoeuvrability of zeppelins made them unsafe. The first international aviation conference in 
1889 raised four fundamental juridical questions with regard to national sovereignty of the 
airspace and safety of aviation (Freer, 1986a): 
• Should governments license civil aviation? 
• Should there be special legislation to regulate responsibility of aviators towards 
their passengers, public and owners of the land where descent is made? 
• Should the salvage of aerial wrecks be governed by maritime law? 
• Should there be new rules for establishing the absence or death of lost aviators? 
Establishing rules for uncontrolled flights in airspace or above territorial waters led to the first 
international aerial congress amongst 21 states in 1910 in Paris. The First World War spurred 
aviation technology, leading in 1919 to the International Air Convention on technical, judicial, 
and military aspects of aviation and the establishment of the International Commission for Air 
navigation (ICAN) (Freer, 1986b). The answers to these questions firmly establish safety and the 
investigation of accidents as a distinguishing feature of the aviation sector.  
Compared to the other transport modalities, aviation may be seen as the safest way to travel. In 
aviation, the absolute number of fatalities in 2004 has regained the level of 1945 with about 430 
fatalities worldwide, while production increased from 9 million to 1.8 billion passenger kms. 
Consequently, aviation has improved its safety performance since 1945 by a factor of 200. 
Simultaneously, road traffic production has tremendously increased on a global scale, but counts 
for about 1.2 million fatalities and 50 million injuries per year worldwide. The WHO identifies 
road safety as a global public health issue because road accidents are expected to become the 
third cause of death in 2020 (WHO, 2004). Maritime shipping and railways take an intermediate 
position in the safety comparison, because they contain specific safety critical issues such as ro-
ro vessels and ferry disasters and track worker and level road crossing accidents respectively. It 
is an open debate whether accident investigations have been a main contributor to the increase in 
safety performance in aviation. In this article, the role of accident investigation as a systemic tool 
for safety improvement is explored across the modes of transportation. 
The aviation sector was not the only sector to institutionalize its focus on accident investigation. 
Aviation and railways have a common background in recognizing the importance of 
understanding failure of complex systems, in particular where public confidence in their 
operational performance is at stake. Both modalities have a safety performance that far exceeds 
the performance of other modalities (Litman, 2005). Both aviation and railways do not only have 
a function as public transport modality, but also are subjected to a high public profile in case of a 
major event due to the numbers of casualties and material damage inflicted during the accident. 
During the early development of both these public transport systems, the precaution principle has 
been applied as the most sophisticated engineering design approach of the 19th century. This 
precaution principle combines a timely response to failure with an in-depth analysis in order to 
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understand the failure mechanisms. It was only during the Second World War that a probabilistic 
component in safety thinking was added as a second school of thinking to this approach to 
facilitate prioritization and cost-effectiveness estimates of safety enhancement measures. After 
the Second World War, risk management on a company level was introduced as a third school in 
thinking, evolving into a public safety and governance between all actors involved in safety in 
the transportation area (McIntyre, 2000). 
In contrast to railways, which developed as a national transport system rather than on an 
international basis, aviation has maintained its international orientation throughout its 
development. Consequently, accident investigation has been based on an international consensus 
across stakeholders and nations through the implementation of Annex 13 of the ICAO 
agreement.  
1.1 ICAO Annex 13 
The landmark Annex 13 on accident investigation of the treaty establishing the International 
Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) in 1944 was itself part of an evolutionary process aimed at 
assuring a safe, international aviation industry. As early as in the Interbellum, accident 
investigation in aviation was a crucial tool in safety enhancement. This type of dealing with 
failure emerged from the military aviation and rapidly spread to the civil sector. The British Air 
Accidents Investigation Branch had its origin in the Royal Flying Corps in 1915. The Air 
Navigation Act 1920 gave the Secretary of State for Air power to make regulations for 
investigating air accidents. By that time, air crashes were investigated in almost every country in 
Europe as a prerequisite for developing an international civil aviation network.  
Towards the close of the Second World War, the USA, Canada and the UK took the initiative to 
establish ICAO to harmonize international civil aviation and set standards and procedures for 
developing the sector on a global scale. The Chicago conference dealt with routes, rates, fares 
and frequencies, elaborating on the commission that gathered in Paris in 1910 on the technical 
aspects of air navigation. The conference was not a total success; many issues were settled along 
lines of bilateral agreements rather than global treaties. 
But accident investigation was successfully negotiated.  As part of the treaty, a series of Annexes 
was drafted, including Annex 13, setting rules and standards for accident and incident 
investigation. To avoid a conflict between States, this Annex set forth conditions facilitating 
participation of stakeholder States -such as nations of manufacture, operation or registration- in 
an accident investigation conducted by the State of occurrence. (Freer, 1994).  Key to the 
agreement was a strict separation is maintained between technical investigations and judicial 
inquiries, as a result of a clear distinction between blame and causation for the benefit of taking 
rapid and necessary measures.  
As the flywheel for progress the level of technical harmonization is selected focusing on 
navigation, communication and reliability. The precaution principle and a timely feedback of 
findings are pivotal. Annex 13 set the terms for cooperation between states which are involved in 
an aviation accident, namely the States of occurrence, operations, registry and manufacturing. 
(ICAO, 2001). 
This agreement, which now appears to be simple common sense, needs to be understood in the 
context of its era.  In 1944, the US and UK national administrations fulfilled the role of problem 
Flying is the safest way to travel: How aviation was a pioneer in independent  
accident investigation 
 
European Journal of Transport and Infrastructure Research 
118 
owner. Operators were still in their infancy and focused on their own world region. A fierce, 
wartime related competition was going on between the many American and British aircraft 
designers and manufacturers. Due to the war, many former European competitors had not even 
started with their revival, if allowed at all by the allies in contrast with the UK and US aviation 
industries, which were on their peak production due to the war. The UK and US took their 
natural role as the advocates for internationalization of civil aviation. However, they had to cope 
with a careful coordination and cooperation with other sovereign national state interests. 
After the war, the implementation of accident investigation primarily focused on technological 
development of the aircraft. Many resources had to be invested in improving the technical 
reliability of the aircraft, because new technologies were in their infancy, causing teething 
troubles in various areas. New technologies involved the introduction of pressurized cabins, jet 
engine technology, radar and all-metal airframes. 
The large-scale introduction of civil aviation required a change in aircraft design. Before the war, 
civil aircraft were derivatives of military aircraft with respect to their design concepts as well to 
their construction and materials. After the war, large civil aircraft had to transport great numbers 
of passengers over long distances, based on regular timetables, putting high demands on 
endurance, range and comfort. In contrast to these requirements, military aircraft were designed 
for relatively short-range combat performance, serving as airborne battle stations. National 
administrations were tasked with certification of these civil aircraft, in contrast with military 
aircraft, which remained submitted to a manufacturer based certification process. 
1.2 Separation from blame 
Even before the Second World War, the concept of learning from deficiencies was promulgated 
in aviation.  Safety was viewed as an industry-wide problem, rather than one for any single 
operator, manufacturer or State. The concept was further developed in wartime aviation.  
Flanagan et al. (1948) conducted possibly the first study of incidents and "near misses" in 
aviation when he surveyed U.S. Army Air Corps crews to determine what factors influenced 
mission success and failure.  Anticipating modern results, he found that the critical factors were 
to be found more in human performance than aircraft technology.  In order to keep public faith in 
the aviation industry, a common process of learning without allocating blame was deemed 
necessary. In order to provide a timely feedback to all stakeholders in the sector, accident 
investigations had to be separated from judicial procedures, which focus on individual 
responsibilities and liability. 
This attitude of the aviation sector in this regard may be viewed as a precursor to the 
precautionary principle, which finds its current expression with regard to aviation in RIVM 
(2003): 
 
In order to protect the aviators from threats of serious or irreversible damage, a timely response 
is required, while a lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing 
cost-effective measures to prevent further degradation.   
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Consequently, two types of investigations emerged, which could be conducted parallel to each 
other: an independent technical investigation into the causes of an accident and a judicial inquiry 
into responsibilities and liability. 
The blame-free approach has clearly borne fruit.  Technical investigations into the failure of 
designing and operating aircraft have seen an impressive development. Based on a limited 
number of ‘showcases’ design principles were developed, such as fail-safe, safe life, damage 
tolerance, crash worthiness, situation awareness or graceful degradation. Several famous cases 
such as the De Havilland Comet, Tenerife, UA-232 Mount Erebus, TWA-800, Valuejet and 
Swissair have identified deficiencies in the aviation system, sometimes at some remove from the 
proximal cause of the triggering event. They have led to many practical changes as well as new 
expertise on specific academic areas varying from as metal fatigue to human failure, crew 
resource management or life-cycle maintenance. 
1.3 Independence from state interference 
During the 1960s, the issue of independence was raised in order to relieve investigations from a 
dominant influence of the State. During investigations, the influence of State interests, secondary 
causal factors and circumstantial influences should also be addressed. The debate on this matter 
can be traced to around 1937, after a series of major air crashes. Arriving at such independence, 
however, proved to be a long process, and still is not completed.  The current situation ranges 
from full independence—largely to be found in North America, Australia and New Zealand, 
Scandinavia and the Netherlands, nominal dependence but factual independence—such as in 
Germany and the United Kingdom, and dependence.  Progress has been slow as nations own 
national airlines and therefore are both stakeholders and expertise providers in accident 
investigation (see Cairns, 1961).  Smart (2004), reviewing the history of accident investigation, 
also views the fundamental differences between inquisitory and accusatory legal systems in the 
various European countries as having a role in the different paces of development, as well as the 
slowness in implementing the recommendations of the 1988 Wilkinson and Rapp reports calling 
for harmonization of European aviation investigation. 
Today, the European Union seems to be heading for a single-mode, international accident 
investigation board, exclusively focusing on aviation. Major players are the UK, France and 
Federal Republic of Germany, counterbalancing the influence of a strong US/Canadian industrial 
position. 
The introduction of the EU Directives on mandatory, independent maritime and railway 
investigation agencies strengthens a wider application of accident investigation along lines of 
modality specific developments (ETSC, 2001). 
In responding to specific European needs in harmonizing practices current in the States of the 
Community, an additional procedural arrangement on ICAO Annex 13 has been developed. This 
development led to the EU Directive 94/56/EC on Accident Investigation, despite fundamental 
differences between legal systems in the various countries of the Community. Conflicts of 
interest linked to the issue of double inquiries by technical permanent bodies and by judicial 
authorities were recognized, but nevertheless lead to a Community strategy to adaptation of the 
existing legal and institutional framework, harmonizing national legislation and strengthening 
cooperation between Member States. 
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As a consequence of the notion that incident investigation and analysis could be a source for 
safety recommendations, the EU has issued a Directive 2003/42/EC on mandatory incident 
registration in aviation. Sofar, the aviation sector has been unique in issuing mandatory 
investigation of incidents in addition to accident investigations.  
Although strong relations have remained between military and civil accident investigations, 
military accident investigations have had its counterpart of ICAO Annex 13 in the NATO 
Standardization Agreement (Stanag) on the Investigation of Aircraft/Missile Accidents/Incidents. 
2. Other transport modalities have had more difficulty getting off the ground 
Other transport modalities - rail, sea, road - have not enjoyed the success of aviation in 
establishing independent, blame free investigation.  Here, we briefly summarize the evolution of 
these other modalities, using the Netherlands as a not atypical case in point. 
For further reading on this topic a reference is made to Roed-Larssen, Stoop and Funnemark 
(2005). 
2.1 The railway sector 
In the railway sector, accident investigation into the technical causes of railway disaster was 
established in the middle of the 19th century. Although the role of the state was initially asserted 
in order to control private railway companies, the nationalization of railways in many countries 
eliminated hampered any international harmonization.  Unlike aviation, rail infrastructure was on 
the ground and strictly within national boundaries.  Even the gauge of track width was not 
immediately standardized, and international rail traffic was not as rapid to develop as 
international aviation. Thus, the issue of railway safety was on a national level, and because 
railways were by and large nationalized, the responsibility of the owning national government.  
Only recently have trends such as privatization of the rail system, high-speed trains that increase 
the international component of rail traffic, and the European Commission-sponsored 
encouragement of Trans European Networks taken some of the notion of national ownership of 
rail safety away; this remains work in progress. This, in conjunction with rapid technological 
developments in high-speed trains, light-rail developments and the establishment of dedicated 
cargo or passenger railway corridors, has led to a call for common safety standards throughout 
Europe. At the same time, several major railway accidents have occurred in the UK, Germany 
and Norway, triggering public interest in safety of the railways.  
The Dutch have been leaders in the separation between blame and causation in rail (SOR, 1997). 
The groundwork for this was laid in the middle of the 19th century, when the Dutch government 
took a role in technical investigations into railway accidents. In 1860, a Supervisory Council was 
established, based on the need to monitor technical failure during implementation of 
improvements on the railways such as exploding steam boilers, derailment of trains, deficient 
pneumatic braking systems, signalling failures and railway crossings with bridges and roads. 
From 1925, on an investigative State Committee with permanent members existed, which were 
ad-hoc available in case of railway accidents. This State Committee however never assembled.  
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Full maturity of rail accident investigation in the Netherlands only occurred after a series of 
major accidents in the early fifties.  The Dutch Parliament established a permanent and 
independent Railway Accident Investigation Board (SOR for its Dutch name) in 1956 
(Jongerius, 1993). The SOR was merged with the other transport modes in 1999 into the Dutch 
Transport Safety Board and in February 2005, this board was itself merged into a general Safety 
Investigation Board. 
From its inception, the Dutch SOR has been a pioneer in accident investigations with respect to 
combining its systems approach with independence. This example has been followed by other 
countries from the 1990’s on, being the USA, Canada, Sweden, Finland, Australia, New Zealand 
and India. Other countries more and more accept the concept of a systems approach, but only the 
above mentioned have chosen the combined concept. 
This SOR developed a vision which copied the orientation of aviation. In this vision, it was 
assumed that duplicate investigations of the same accident—by the railway company, by the 
government railway inspectorate, and by the SOR itself—was inefficient.  For blame, the first 
two investigations were sufficient, and the SOR could only add value in adopting a different 
approach. Consequently, the SOR did not focus on disciplinary actions against a train driver, but 
focused on identifying accident causation factors on higher systems levels. Organization, 
management responsibilities for training, equipment, rolling stock, signalling and infrastructure 
came under scrutiny as well. The SOR was probably able to develop this vision because its 
membership came from a combination of technological experts from the Delft University of 
Technology, judicial magistrates and experienced operators. This composition enabled the SOR 
to identify systemic deficiencies in the railway system based on a combined expertise in 
technological analysis, ability in causal thinking and operational practice. 
2.2 The maritime sector 
In shipping, the international component has always been present, but technology was not so fast 
to develop.  Although similarities exist between ICAO Annexes and International Maritime 
Organization (IMO) resolutions, the shipping sector has seen a different development with 
respect to accident investigation. Technological innovations such as navigation and 
communication electronics did not occur at the same time as other developments such as double 
hull development, nuclear power propulsion, or other safety-related advances in merchant 
shipping. A territorial state interest was not pervasive because most maritime accidents take 
place in international waters, often far from the country of registry. Because voyage and data 
recorders are recent additions to maritime shipping, accident investigation tended to focus on the 
human factor.  This in turn led to an historical focus on blame, with the countervailing force of 
maritime guild organizations taking control of investigations to protect their membership from 
"inexpert" blame.  The Dutch Maritime Board, founded in 1909, is a classical example of this, 
with a membership selected from amongst sector veterans, and a concentrated focus on policing 
its own membership instead of letting civil courts adjudicate human errors.  
Maritime safety has entered public awareness largely through human disasters (the Herald of 
Free Enterprise ferry and others) and environmental damage (the Exxon Valdez and others).  
Here, compensation for victims largely dominated accident prevention, and the focus was clearly 
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upon blame.  National interests were also so dominant that a fully independent investigation was 
hindered. 
Modern independent safety investigation in the maritime is generally only found where 
multimodal safety boards have been established (e.g., USA, Canada, Finland, Sweden, the 
Netherlands), and even there, success is slow in coming.  The Dutch Maritime Board 
successfully avoided integration into the multimodal Transport Safety Board for several years.  
The Estonia ferry disaster, jointly investigated by Sweden and Finland, is not regarded as a 
highly successful investigation.  An interesting exception to this pattern is the UK Maritime 
Accident Investigation Branch, which, although nominally not independent of government, 
effectively functions independently. 
At a European level, mandatory maritime accident investigations are restricted to specific 
segments of the maritime sector such as high speed passenger crafts and ro-ro ferries. This 
obligation has been established in the EU 1999/35/CE  Directive. Previously, the IMO 
(International Maritime Organisation) has set the context for investigating maritime casualties 
and incidents by issuing Resolution A.849(20) and A.884(21). 
2.3 The road traffic sector 
In the road traffic sector, the dominance of the private sector and the fact that road accidents are 
very frequent but not severe compared to other modal accidents, have led to a slow development 
of modern accident investigation.  Most accident investigations are done by the police and 
insurance companies instead of independent boards; indeed, the boards would be overwhelmed if 
required to investigate all but a small minority of road accidents.  Technical investigations have 
been restricted to the automotive industry as a responsibility of car manufacturers. A limited 
number of leading car manufacturers have contributed to a major extent to the improvement of 
the safety of road vehicles. Emphasis has been laid on the safety of the occupants. In addition to 
the technical reliability of the cars, a reduction of the secondary effects to occupants in reducing 
injuries has been focal. National states have had very limited interest in accident investigation 
apart from police investigation for judicial purposes. Insurance companies and the health care 
system cover non-judicial issues. There does not seem to be a structural need within the road 
traffic sector itself by the abundant presence of compensatory mechanisms at a societal level. 
In addition, public pressure seems to be weak. Public perception of road accidents indicates that 
such accidents are classified and perceived by the public as high-probability/low-consequence 
events. Such small-scale events leave little public concern and are psychologically different from 
events with multiple casualties in the group risk segment of public risk perception. Due to the 
involvement of the health sector in road injury and mental trauma treatment, road traffic safety 
frequently is defined as a health problem rather than a transportation problem. 
3. Unifying modalities to level the playing field 
The head start of the aviation sector is being compensated for by the growth of multimodal 
investigation boards. This growth is powered by three engines of change. 
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3.1 Multimodality 
The initiative for this development started in the USA, where in 1967 the National 
Transportation Safety Board becomes the first multi-modal investigation agency in the world. 
Multi-modal boards followed in Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Sweden, Finland and the 
Netherlands. In addition to a visionary approach, based on the concept of multi-modal and 
systemic learning, arguments of economy of scale, critical mass in investigative resources and 
organizational efficiency play an important role in particular in smaller countries (Kahan, 1998). 
Establishing such multi-modal boards is frequently initiated by parliamentary interference after 
one or more major events, which disrupt a public confidence in the transport systems. A 
breakthrough of independent investigations in the public eye occurs after a series of major events 
outside the transportation sector, such as with disco fires in Sweden and the Netherlands. The 
European Union takes initiatives to advocate independent accident investigations as a 
consequence of the introduction of the Seveso Directive on major hazards. 
Recently, a new development in accident investigation has emerged. Transportation Safety 
Boards are faced with new missions, dealing with public faith, serving as a public safety 
assessor, support to victims and relatives in taking care of family assistance and focusing on 
rescue and emergency services in their performance in dealing with the aftermath of major 
accidents (MPM, 2002; Stoop, 2002; Stoop, 2004). 
In an even wider context, due to the occurrence of disasters in other sectors, various 
Transportation Safety Boards in Europe are developing into multi-sectorial agencies, covering 
other sectors such as health, defence, industrial sectors, natural disaster, and events such as 
explosions, major fires and collapse of buildings. In this respect, independent accident 
investigation is considered every citizens’ right, society’s’ duty (Van Vollenhoven, 2001). 
In the USA, this broadening of the concept of independent investigations has lead to the 
establishment of the Chemical Safety Board and National Construction Safety Team Act 
following the role model of the National Transportation Safety Board. 
3.2 The engines of change 
Three engines for change can be identified which each by themselves, are a necessary condition 
for accident investigation. In addition, they have to occur simultaneously in order to implement 
the concept in a sector on a sustainable basis.  
These engines are: 
• The role of the state and its sovereignty in an international context. 
• Technological innovation and its reliable performance on a large scale. 
• Separation of technical investigations and judicial inquiries, based on the 
principle of precaution. 
 
As these engines coincide, a structural need for timely adaptations and system change occurs. 
Impulses for change can be explained based on the structural needs of the sector itself, not by a 
public concern on the credibility of a sector. In case of an outside impulse, such as with aviation 
disaster, sometimes several similar accidents have to occur before a sector responds.  
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A worldwide implementation of accident investigation in aviation may be considered a unique 
coincidence of three necessary conditions for a sector-internal motivation to conduct accident 
investigations.  
This implementation has not only lead to a significant increase in safety, but also contributed to 
developing expertise and knowledge about the actual safety performance of the sector. A vital 
issue has been maintaining public confidence in the sector in order to develop a worldwide 
aviation industry. 
On one hand, in passenger transport, the public is the customer who puts its faith in a safe, 
efficient and smooth performance of the services rendered. Once this faith is lost, the sector will 
have to face the fear of going out of business as has been recently demonstrated by the WTC 
attack, Gulf war and SARS. 
On the other hand, the performance of the transport sector is in the public domain. Accident are 
visible in the public eye, being bystanders and potential risk bearers in case of a transportation 
disaster, such as an air crash in an apartment building, a release of hazardous materials or a 
tunnel fire. Rescue and emergency in incident and disaster handling are public duties in case of a 
transportation disaster. Public governance is a direct stakeholder in transportation accidents in 
contrast to site managers of fixed installations in other sectors of industry. 
Due to the complexity and high-technology nature, aviation has additional specific 
characteristics, which necessitate a technical investigation into unexplained failure of such 
transportation systems, based on the precaution principle. Similar characteristics are emerging in 
railway systems with the development of Trans-European Networks, technological innovation 
and privatization of national railway companies. 
3.3 Aviation and rail remain more advanced 
It may not be surprising in this context that a present trend towards multi-modal national safety 
boards primarily covers the aviation and railway sector. 
In aviation, both schools dealing with failure have been applied, providing a basis for a 
redundant strategy for safety performance. Combining both schools provides a synthesis between 
a deterministic approach, based on understanding failure and a probabilistic approach, based on 
predicting failure. 
Historically, the railway sector has not seen such a worldwide implementation of independent 
accident and incident investigation as in aviation. The engines that have driven change were not 
so powerful due to the characteristics in national railway companies in the various countries 
across the world. Recent developments in railways, such as interoperable international networks, 
introduction of technological innovation and the changing role of the state have brought more 
similarities with the aviation sector. 
Due to these major changes, the advocacy for independent accident investigation agencies in 
railways is growing. In various countries, such as in Japan, Korea, Scandinavia, the UK, the 
Netherlands, USA, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, combined independent safety 
investigation agencies include at least aviation and railways. They seem to be the pathfinders for 
a multi-modal safety strategy. 
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4. Conclusion 
The driving forces for independent accident investigations come from both within a sector and 
without.  From within, improvements in technology and a need for awareness of potential 
negative effects of technology drive the need to understand the causes of accidents.  From 
without, public trust, political pressure and international coordination drive the need to prevent 
and mitigate accidents.  For the commercial aviation sector, all of these came together at the 
same time, as the need for interoperability, punctuality and reliability, international 
determination of responsibility and responding to the inherent human fear of being in the sky 
with nothing between you and the ground but air converged to demand the highest standards of 
proactive safety.  In other sectors, legacy systems such as guild protection, intra-national needs 
for guilt assignment and punishment, and a different rate of technological development meant 
that pressures for adoption of causality-oriented safety science were not as great.  
 
Nowadays, at the European level, it is recognized that independent safety investigations 
represent a citizens’ right and society’s duty for investigating systems deficiencies in all sectors 
of society (Van Vollenhoven, 2001). The European Commission has installed a Group of Experts 
with the task to harmonize investigations by developing a common methodology and to adapt 
existing investigation techniques and methods to new requirements of changing technologies and 
institutional constraints. 
 
In recent times, the increasing internationalization of nearly everything, the accelerated rate of 
technological development and increased consumer demand for safety have brought not only 
transport but also other sectors to adopt the accident investigation methods pioneered in aviation. 
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